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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper develops and applies a regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for 
environmental and energy policy in a federal state. This regional CGE model differs from the 
national CGE models by taking into account the interregional mobility of labor, the common 
product market across the regions and the explicit modeling of two government levels within 
one nation. We illustrate our regional CGE model with an analysis of the NEC Directive
1 in 
Belgium. The NEC Directive sets upper limits for each EU member state in 2010 for the total 
emissions of four pollutants, responsible for acidification, eutrophication and ground-level ozone 
pollution. These pollutants are sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic 
compounds (VOC), and ammonia (NH3).  
Whereas the earliest policy-oriented computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies were 
developed in the 1970s
2, CGE models applied to regional economies are more recent. One 
possible reason for the scarcity and late start of regional CGE modeling is its complexity and 
implementation cost. The costs of regional CGE models may outweigh the benefits. First, CGE 
models are very data intensive, requiring data on industry output, industry technology, 
consumption and investment expenditures, government expenditures and taxes, trade flows, 
                                                       
1 Officially known as Directive 2001/81/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on National Emission Ceilings 
for certain pollutants (NECs). 
2 For an overview, see Partridge and Rickman (1998).    
and factor ownership patterns. These data are much more readily available at national level 
than at regional level. In addition, further complications arise with the appropriate definition of a 
region such as the degree of factor specificity/mobility and regional product differentiation 
(Partridge and Rickman, 1998). The greater openness of the regional economy complicates 
regional CGE modeling. Regions trade not only with foreign countries, but also with other 
regions in the same country. Labor is more likely to be mobile between regions in a country than 
between countries. Similarly, savings by residents in the region are less likely to influence 
investment in the region. Interregional commuting creates a divergence between the region of 
factor employment and region of expenditure of factor income. Finally, there are vertical 
externalities between regional and federal levels of government, because the tax bases of the 
various government levels are (partially) shared. Moreover, in most federations, there are 
important constitutional monetary transfers between the government levels. 
Regional CGE models dealing with energy or environmental issues are relatively rare. Conrad 
and Schröder (1991, 1993) analyze the choice between emission taxes or abatement subsidies 
for climate change policy in Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany. In a partial equilibrium model the 
welfare effects of the two policies are identical if a small open economy is assumed. This is not 
longer the case in a general equilibrium setting. Li and Rose (1995) measure the impact of 
emission controls in Pennsylvania. They stress that the substitution from energy towards other 
input and the reallocation of factors across sectors mitigate the costs. However, they note that 
higher regional mobility of factors may induce higher costs of regional environmental policy. 
André et al. (2005) analyze an environmental tax reform and the double dividend hypothesis for 
CO2-and SO2-policy in Andalusia, Spain. The double dividend literature
3 argues that substituting 
environmental taxes for pre-existing distorting taxes may yield not only a cleaner environment 
but also a more efficient way of raising revenue. André et al. (2005) find an employment double 
dividend if the payroll tax is selected to recycle the excess environmental tax revenues. The 
opportunities for a strong double dividend are very limited.  
                                                       
3 Three types of double dividend are distinguished (Goulder, 1995; Carraro et al., 1996). The weak double dividend 
states that, by using the environmental tax revenues to cut distorting taxes, one can achieve non-environmental cost 
savings compared to the case where the revenues of the environmental taxes are recycled in a lump-sum fashion. The 
strong double dividend holds if an environmental tax reform raises welfare through both environmental benefits and 
higher non-environmental efficiency of the tax system. An employment double dividend is obtained if an environmental 
tax reform improves the quality of the environment and boosts employment.    
While the aforementioned regional CGE models mostly follow the framework of the national 
CGE models, we capture more specific characteristics of regional modeling. First, in our model, 
each region has its own labor market but interregional commuting limits the wage differential 
between regions. This approach takes into account the significant interregional commuting in 
small federations (e.g. Belgium) or metropolitan areas. Second, most national and regional CGE 
models use the Armington assumption, where goods produced in different regions and 
countries are assumed to be imperfect substitutes (Armington, 1969). Our model has only one 
goods market per country, and the goods produced in the regions of one country are perfect 
substitutes. The Armington assumption, however, is still used for goods imported from other 
countries. Finally, we explicitly model the fiscal responsibilities of the various government levels. 
We allocate the tax revenues to the appropriate government level and model the monetary 
transfer mechanisms between the government levels.   
The aim of this chapter is developing a regional CGE model which can be used for the analysis 
of environmental and energy policy in a multi-region and multi-government setting. We start 
from the multi-national GEM-E3 model
4 and subdivide one country in three regions. This country 
has two government levels but a common labor and goods market for the regions. The GEM-E3 
model is a CGE model for the European and World Economy, modeling the economy, the 
energy system and the environment. It has been used to evaluate the welfare impacts of 
various environmental policies
5. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains briefly the federal structure of 
Belgium. Section 3 presents the general characteristics of the standard GEM-E3 model, and 
discusses how the model is extended to take into account a country with several regions. In 
section 4, a simple simulation illustrates the main mechanisms at work in the regional model. In 
section 5, we describe the NEC directive and use the regionalized GEM-E3 model to simulate 
the NEC directive for Belgium. In section 6 we conclude and discuss some caveats. 
                                                       
4 The GEM-E3 model was built under the auspices of the European Commission by a consortium involving principally 
NTUA, KUL, ZEW and ERASME. For more details on the model, we refer to Capros et al. (1997). 
5 See e.g. Capros et al. (1999), Jansen and Klaassen (2000), Proost and Van Regemorter (2000, 2004), Mayeres and 
Van Regemorter (2003), Criqui et al. (2003), and Russ et al. (2005). The GEM-E3 model has been used for non-
environmental analyses as well. Conrad et al. (2005) use the GEM-E3 model to analyze the economy-wide effects of a 
labor market reform in Germany.    
2.  MODELING THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF BELGIUM 
First, we explain the federal structure of Belgium. Further, we present the data corresponding to 
the federal structure of Belgium. 
Since the 1970s five reforms of the constitution
6 have transformed Belgium into a federation 
with increasingly more autonomy for the three regions and three communities. The three 
regions – Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Capital – are responsible for geographically related 
issues as environment, road infrastructure, and land management, whereas the three 
communities – Flemish, French, and German – deal with personally related issues as culture 
and education. The borders of regions and communities do not fully overlap. Both the Flemish 
and French community are active in Brussels-Capital region. The German community is a part 
of Wallonia (Figure 1). 
Each constitutional reform resulted in more autonomy for the lower levels. Unfortunately, they 
also made the relations between the government levels increasingly complex. In our analysis, 
we lump the communities with the three regions for the sake of simplicity. 
(a)  Federal Government and Social Security 
The federal budget and the social security budget account for 24% and 39% of the total budget 
of all Belgian governments, respectively. The main tax revenues are corporate taxes, direct 
income taxes, capital taxes and value-added taxes. Moreover, two environmentally related 
taxes remain on the federal level: the energy excises, which are the main environmentally 
related taxes, and environmental consumption taxes on e.g. batteries, razor blades, plastic and 
carton bottles, etc. The contributions (mainly payroll taxes) and expenditures of the social 
security remain mostly on the federal level. Some social services are provided by the lower 




                                                       
6 The timing of the various reforms was 1970, 1980, 1988-1989, 1993 and 2001-2003. From 2007 on, new institutional 
reforms are expected, possibly resulting in more (fiscal) autonomy for the regions.     
Figure 1: The Federal State of Belgium 
 
Source:  www.belgium.be 
(b) Regions  and  Communities 
The aggregate budget of the regions and communities corresponds to 24% of the Belgian total 
of government budgets. Today, the fiscal autonomy of the Belgian regions is rather small. The 
regions are competent for a number of smaller taxes, with the inheritance taxes, property taxes 
and car taxes being more important. In 1988 the regions became competent for the main 
environmental issues
7. However, the regions only set some non-energy environmental taxes 
(manure, waste disposal, etc). 
A large share of their budget is financed through transfers from the federal level. The transfer 
mechanisms to the lower government levels are complex. The monetary transfer that a region 
                                                       
7 The federal level remains responsible for product norms, protection against radiation and transport of waste.    
receives is a function of the number of students in the community and the regional origins from 
the personal direct income tax revenues. The transfers are absolute amounts and they evolve 
independently from the collected tax revenues by the federal government. 
(c)  Municipalities and Provinces 
The municipalities and provinces finance their budgets (13% of the Belgian total) mainly with 
taxes (47%), transfers from other government levels (20%), dividends and revenues from 
services. The two main taxes, a shared property tax and a shared tax on the direct income of 
their inhabitants, represent each about 40% of the tax revenues. The other taxes are rather 
diverse. In our analysis the municipalities and provinces are lumped with the regions and 
communities.  
3. THE  REGIONAL  GEM-E3 MODEL FOR BELGIUM 
First we discuss successively the characteristics of standard GEM-E3 model and the regional 
GEM-E3 model. Then, we give an overview of the data that are used. 
3.1.   The Standard GEM-E3 Model: General Characteristics 
The standard version of the GEM-E3 model is an applied general equilibrium model, 
simultaneously representing world regions or EU member states, linked through endogenous 
bilateral trade. There is a high degree of endogeneity between sectors of the economy. GEM-
E3 covers the interactions between the economy, the energy system and the environment. 
There are two versions of GEM-E3, GEM-E3 Europe and GEM-E3 World. They differ in their 
geographical and sectoral coverage, but the model specification is the same. The European 
version covers 27 EU countries (all EU countries) and the rest of the world (in a reduced form). 
This paper starts from the GEM-E3 Europe model and develops a third version, the regional 
GEM-E3 model. The data are based on the EUROSTAT database (Input-Output tables and 
National Accounts data). The base year is 1995. 
The model has the following general features: 
(a) General  Characteristics 
The GEM-E3 model computes the equilibrium prices of goods, services, labor, capital and 
tradable emission rights such that all markets simultaneously clear under the Walras law. The    
competitive market equilibrium under Walras’ law also includes more detailed equilibria in 
energy demand/supply and emission/abatement.  
Although the model is global/European, the sectors, structural features of energy/environment 
and policy-oriented instruments (e.g. taxation) are disaggregated. GEM-E3 evaluates 
consistently the distributional effects for the various economic sectors and agents across the 
countries. The economic consequences of environmental or economic policies can be analyzed 
on a national level, while ensuring that the World/European economy remains in equilibrium.  
The model is dynamic, driven by the accumulation of capital and equipment. Technological 
progress is explicitly represented in the production functions. 
(b)  Behavior of Agents 
The economic agents optimize each their objective and determine separately the supply or 
demand of capital, energy, environment, labor and other goods. Market derived prices 
endogenously guarantee a global equilibrium. 
The production of the firms is modeled with a nested CES neo-classical production function, 
using capital, labor, energy and intermediate consumption of goods from other branches. The 
model allows for alternative market clearing mechanisms, in addition to perfect competition.  
The model allows for various degrees of capital mobility (across sectors or national borders). 
The amount of capital is fixed within each period. The investment decisions of the firms in the 
current period affect the stock of capital in the next period. 
The consumers decide endogenously on their demand of goods and services using a nested 
Stone Geary utility function
8. In a first stage, a representative consumer for each region 
allocates their total expected income between total consumption of goods and services (both 
durables and non-durables), leisure and savings. In a second stage, the utility function 
distinguishes between durable (equipment) and consumable goods and services. The rationale 
behind the distinction between durables and non-durables is the assumption that the 
                                                       
8 Stone-Geary utility function is a simple generalization of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the extension being that 
consumption is measured relative to subsistence levels of consumption of the goods.    
households obtain utility from consuming a non-durable good or service and from using a 
durable good. 
If the economic conditions are favorable, households can supply more labor to the detriment of 
their leisure time. Labor is immobile across national borders. 
The demand of goods by the final consumers, firms (for intermediate consumption and 
investment) and the public sector constitutes the total domestic demand. This total demand is 
allocated between domestic goods and imported goods, using the Armington specification. The 
behavior of the rest of the world is exogenous.  
Government behavior is exogenous. The model distinguishes between 9 categories of receipts, 
including indirect taxes, environmental taxes, direct taxes, value added taxes, production 
subsidies, social security contributions, import duties, foreign transfers and government firms. 
(c) Environmental  Module 
The environmental module of GEM-E3 concentrates on three air pollution problems: (i) climate 
change (ii) acidification and eutrophication through deposition of emissions, and (iii) ambient air 
quality linked to tropospheric ozone concentration.  
The model evaluates the energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), sulphur dioxide (SO2), volatile organic compounds (VOC), ammonia (NH3) and 
particulates (PM10). There are three mechanisms of emission reduction explicitly specified in the 
model: (i) substitution between fuels and between energetic and non-energetic inputs, (ii) 
emission reduction due to a decline in production and consumption, and (iii) purchasing 
abatement equipment.  
The model is able to compare the welfare effects of various environmental instruments, such as 
taxes, various forms of pollution permits and command-and-control policy. It is also possible to 
consider various systems of revenue recycling. 
The standard GEM-E3 model takes into account both costs and benefits of environmental 
policy. It includes an environmental quality function that depends on the emissions and that has    
an impact on welfare through the utility function. It is assumed that environmental quality 
provides a separable contribution to the consumers’ welfare.  
3.2.   Characteristics of the Regional Model 
We focus on the characteristics of the regional extension of the standard GEM-E3 model. First, 
the Regional GEM-E3 model allows to opt for separate regional labor markets. The assumption 
of zero commuting costs implies that wages are identical across the regional labor markets. 
Second, the goods are traded inter-regionally on a common market. Third, the Regional GEM-
E3 has two government levels. Tax revenues may be attributed either to the regional level or 
the federal level. The model also includes monetary transfers between these government levels. 
(a)  Common Labor Market 
The regional model includes a common labor market across all regions of the federal state. The 
labor force is perfectly mobile across regional borders. The total labor supply in all regions 
equals the total labor demand in all regions (5.1). The labor supply of a single region does not 
necessarily equal the labor demand of that same region. Perfect interregional mobility implies 
that wages have to be identical across the regions. 
 
Regions Regions
Labor Supply Labor Demand = ∑∑  (5.1) 
Assumption (5.1) is appropriate for small countries, but may be too strong for regional modeling 
of larger countries. The standard GEM-E3 EU 25 model uses national labor markets. 
Commuting between EU member states is very small. Similarly, commuting between large US 
states as California, and its neighboring states is negligible. However, commuting may be 
significant for the modeling of smaller US states, counties, metropolitan areas or small 
federations. More than 6% of the total labor force in New Jersey State works in New York 
County, NY. In Hudson County, NJ, just across the Hudson River, this share reaches 22%. 
Commuting, however, is not limited to urban regions. About 40% of the labor force in rural 
counties Pierce and St Croix, Wisconsin commute to the industrial Mississippi basin around St 
Paul and Minneapolis, Minnesota (Census 2000). In Belgium, about half of the people working 
in Brussels Capital-Region are commuters from Flanders or Wallonia.    
Commuting from one region to another results in additional (short-term) opportunities of the 
residents to respond to a policy change. If one assumes erroneously that commuting is 
impossible, then the model will overestimate the effects of policy changes when aggregated 
across all the regions of the federal state. Similarly, if one assumes erroneously that the labor 
force can commute freely, then a multi-regional model will underestimate the aggregate effects 
of changes in economic policies. For individual regions, commuting may alleviate or exacerbate 
the effects, as outward commuting raises the regional wages and inward commuting reduces 
the wages (see Chapter 3). 
(b)  Common Goods Markets 
As in the standard model, the Regional GEM-E3 model still uses the Armington assumption for 
trade with foreign countries. Here, the goods produced in the home country and abroad are not 
perfect substitutes. Moreover, this model has a common output market shared by all regions of 
the federal state. Consumers in one region can not distinguish between the regional origins of 
goods produced in their home country. Implicitly, we assume that the goods produced in the 
other regions of the same country are perfect substitutes for the goods produced in the home 
region. Although the assumption of perfect substitutability might not be acceptable for 
international trade models, the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in different 
regions of a federation is likely to be high. This makes the assumption of perfect substitutability 
an acceptable approximation for regional models (Plassmann, 2005). 
In the regional GEM-E3 model, we can also choose the degree of mobility for physical capital. It 
is important to note that full capital mobility/substitutability, combined with free commuting and a 
common market of goods leads to a corner solution where each sector is completely located in 
the cheapest region. We believe that full mobility or substitutability between sectors and regions 
is not realistic in a medium term. Real estate can not cross borders, whereas it is difficult to 
change service offices into an industrial plant. Limiting some factor mobility improves the 
realism of the Regional GEM-E3 model. 
(c) Multi-level  Government 
We explicitly model a multi-level government in the Regional GEM-E3. Each region has a 
regional government with a federal government encompassing all the regions of one country.    
The model is able to take into account the variation in distribution of competences in regulatory 
or fiscal policy, and the type and direction of constitutional transfers across various federations. 
The budget of each government level may be financed by tax revenues, which are set 
autonomously by the government level, or by monetary transfers coming from the other 
government levels. This may lead to two types of vertical interactions between the various 
government levels. First, a policy change of a government level may not only affect its own tax 
bases, but the tax bases of the other government levels as well, increasing or reducing their tax 
revenues (see Chapter 2). Second, as the tax revenues and income levels may change, the 
constitutional monetary transfers between the government levels may also be affected. 
3.3.   Data 
The main constraint for the regional modeling is the lack of regional SAMs. The Social 
Accounting Matrix provides a complete circular flow of regional income and expenditures 
between households, industrial sectors and government levels. 
Table 1: Multi-Level Shares of Taxes 
  Federal Government  Regional Governments 
Direct Taxes  79%  21% 
Indirect Taxes  64%  36% 
Subsidies 0%  100% 
Duties 100%  0% 
VAT 100%  0% 
Government Firms  50%  50% 
Social Security  80%  20% 
In our analysis, we use the SAM for Belgium (1995) and regionalize the Belgian Input-Output 
table using the regional distribution of the added value of the sectors. The investment, private 
and public consumption are regionalized using the respective figures in the regional accounts. 
Export and import are not regionally disaggregated. The tax revenues are allocated to the 
relevant government level using the shares in Table 1. 
The direct taxes include the corporate taxes, direct personal taxes, capital taxes and inheritance 
taxes. The indirect taxes include, among others, the pre-existing environmental taxes.    
Further, we use the environmental data (including the abatement costs) of the EU-25 GEM-E3 
model. The environmental data for the NEC pollutants are based on the RAINS model
9. For all 
regions we use the emission coefficients and abatement cost curves available for Belgium in 
EU25 GEM-E3. We correct, however, for the more service oriented and less energy-intensive 
characteristics of the economy in Brussels Capital-Region. The emission/ added-value ratio in 
Brussels may be totally different from the ratios in Flanders or Wallonia. Typically, Brussels 
holds more emission-low headquarters and coordination centers, whereas the other regions 
have more high-emission production plants (e.g. Ports of Antwerp, Gent and Zeebrugge in 
Flanders, and the Meuse-Samber axis in Wallonia). 
4.  AN ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATION 
CGE models typically try to simulate the whole economy. They take into account a large 
number of counter-acting or reinforcing effects. This section disentangles the main effects by 
starting with a simple model simulation. A single region, Flanders, unilaterally tightens the 
emissions of one pollutant, SO2 (-33.75%), using grandfathered permits. The other regions of 
Belgium or foreign countries do not change their policies. First, we explain the effects in 
Flanders. Second, we discuss the effects which occur in the other regions due to the policy 
reform in Flanders. The policy is analyzed as a counterfactual scenario and is compared against 
a business-as-usual scenario.  
4.1.   Intra-Regional Effects 
Flanders reduces its SO2 emissions with 33.75% compared to the business-as-usual scenario 
(Table 3). As SO2 is a pollutant with important local effects, the environmental quality of 
Flanders improves. SO2 emissions are mainly the result of the use of fossil fuels and a SO2 
policy causes a number of economic effects. Some of them – mostly- affect the SO2-intensive 
energy sectors; whereas the sectors with low SO2 emissions experience only the indirect 
economic effects. 
 
                                                       
9 The RAINS model was developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna, 
Austria.    
Table 2: Change in Sectoral Output and Emplyment (in %) 
  Sector Brussels Flanders Wallonia  Belgium 
Energy Sectors 0.79  -0.81  0.35  -0.37 
Energy Intensive Sectors 0.33  -0.54  0.39  -0.22 
Goods 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
Sectoral Output 
Services 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Energy Sectors 0.41  -0.38  0.28  -0.09 
Energy Intensive Sectors 0.55  -0.81  0.60  -0.24 
Goods 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 
Sectoral Employment 
Services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
As the region tightens the regulation of SO2 emissions, the industrial sectors look for ways to 
reduce their emissions. The sectors can respond to the new regulation in three ways. They can 
try to reduce emissions by substituting sulfur-rich fuels with sulfur-poor fuels; they can install 
SO2 abatement equipment; or they can simply reduce their level of production. Either way, the 
new regulation increases the production costs, reducing the demand for the output of these 
industrial sectors in Flanders. Table 2 shows that the restriction on SO2 emissions reduces the 
output for energy sectors and energy-intensive with 0.81% and 0.54%, respectively. The goods 
and services sectors with low SO2 emissions are hardly affected. 
The higher production costs also reduce the demand for inputs by the energy and energy-
intensive sectors, affecting the regional markets for labor, capital, energy etc. In this way the 
effects of the environmental policy spread from a single market to the rest of the economy. As 
the productivity slows down due to the higher production costs, the returns on capital also drop, 
and there is less appetite for investment. Table 2 shows that the employment drops more in the 
sectors which are directly affected by the new environmental regulation. The lower demand for 
labor by the affected sectors reduces the real wages (with about 0.03% for Flanders and 
Belgium). The lower demand for labor reduces the wages, and overall labor supply in Flanders 
drops. Sectors which are not SO2-intensive, hardly reduce their employment; they may even 
increase employment thanks to the lower wages. The lower wages and the lower labor supply 
reduce the disposable income of the inhabitants in Flanders.  
The environmental policy not only generates environmental benefits by reducing the SO2 
emissions, but also by reducing the emissions of other pollutants associated to energy use. 
Table 3 shows that not only the SO2 emissions drop (with about -33%) but the environmental    
policy also reduces the CO2 and NOx emissions in Flanders (-2,47% and -1,46%, respectively). 
The NH3, PM10 and VOC emissions show smaller reductions, as these pollutants are less 
associated with the use of energy and SO2. 
Table 3: Change in Emissions (%) 
Pollutant Brussels  Flanders  Wallonia  Belgium 
CO2 -0.07 -2.47  0.23  -1.47 
NH3  0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 
NOX  -0.09 -1.46 0.23 -0.87 
PM10 -0.04  -0.76  0.24  -0.43 
SO2  -0.08 -33.75 0.43 -22.40 
VOC -0.01  -0.39  0.08  -0.26 
Whether the prices of capital or energy change significantly, depends, among others, on the 
structure of the import and export markets of these goods and the market power of the local 
production. Typically, regions are small and their unilateral policies do not influence much the 
prices on international goods markets. As the environmental regulation raises the production 
costs, especially of the SO2 polluting sectors, Flanders looses market share on the national and 
international good markets. Table 2 shows that the output of the energy and energy-intensive 
sectors in Brussels and Wallonia increases. This effect partly offsets the output loss in Flanders. 
Overall, the output of Belgium in energy and energy-intensive sectors drops. The Belgian export 
of energy and energy-intensive goods drops with 0.38% and 0.24%, respectively. 
Overall, the environmental regulation causes a decline of the regional economy. Hence, the tax 
bases of regional and federal taxes also shrink, possibly leading to lower tax revenues for all 
government levels (see Chapter 2). The unilateral environmental policy in Flanders decreases 
the environmental and energy tax revenues of the Belgian federal government with 0.31%. As 
environmental taxes correspond to about 2.2% of all tax revenues (federal and regional), the 
overall effect on public consumption is rather limited. The decline of the Flemish economy 
reduces the non-environmental tax revenues (regional and federal) collected in Flanders with 
0.03%.      
4.2.   Inter-Regional Effects 
Although Brussels and Wallonia do not change their environmental policy, they still experience 
the environmental and economic effects of the policy reform in Flanders. The economies of 
Brussels and Wallonia react to these effects causing feedback effects to Flanders and the total 
Belgian economy. 
Although, the effects of SO2 as a pollutant are partially local, the neighboring regions of 
Flanders reforming region also benefit from the new environmental regulation as less SO2 is 
deposited within their borders.   
The non-reforming regions do not reform their own policy and, hence, do not exogenously 
change their production costs. The production costs of Brussels and Wallonia are altered 
endogenously as the unilateral policy of Flanders changes the price of labor, capital and goods 
on the common national markets. The lower demand for employment and the lower wages in 
Flanders cause commuting towards the non-reforming regions until wages are equalized across 
all regions. The environmental policy increases the share of commuters in the total Flemish 
active population from 6,44% to 6,50%. The arrival of commuters in the non-reforming regions 
lowers the real wages (with about -0.03%, as much as in Flanders), and these lower wages 
boost the demand for employment. Table 2 shows that all sectors in Brussels and Wallonia 
increase their employment. This increase is higher for energy and energy-intensive sectors as 
they benefit more from the Flemish loss of market shares. The shares of the regions on the 
goods markets change. The non-reforming regions expand their market shares of SO2-intensive 
goods to the detriment of Flanders. Sectors in the non-reforming regions may also export more 
as they can benefit from cheaper inputs as labor, capital and energy. Unfortunately, the lack of 
regional export data does not allow us to analyze whether the small output increase in Brussels 
and Wallonia is destined for the national or foreign markets. Table 3 shows that the emissions 
of some pollutants, increase slightly due to the higher economic activity. Overall, however, the 
Belgian emissions drop.  
Chapter 3 explains that commuting alleviates the wage decrease in the reforming region and 
causes lower wages in the non-reforming regions. Commuting exports a part of the costs of    
environmental policy of the reforming region to the employees in the non-reforming regions. 
Similarly, lower energy and capital prices may boost the demand in the non-reforming regions. 
However, the small size of the reforming region compared to the international markets limits 
these effects. 
A final effect is through the tax revenues and public services of the various government levels. 
As their economies change, the regional tax revenues by the regional governments also 
change. Moreover, as explained in Chapter 2, a regional environmental reform may cause 
vertical externalities, affecting the public consumption by the federal government. The slightly 
higher economic activity increases the nominal tax revenues (regional and federal) collected in 
Brussels and Wallonia with 0.03% and 0.06%, respectively. The transfers between the 
government levels may also be affected.  
These are the intra-regional and inter-regional effects expected for a command-and-control 
policy or grandfathered permits policy. Economic literature, however, explains that not only the 
level of the environmental target, but also the choice of instruments has important efficiency and 
distributional effects on the economy (e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Goulder et al., 1999). 
The choice for environmental taxes or subsidies causes a redistribution of income across the 
SO2 polluting sectors, the non-polluting sectors, households and the various governments (see 
Chapter 3). Moreover, the use of the tax revenues of pollution taxes also affects the efficiency of 
the economy. In general, the economic literature recommends lowering pre-existing distorting 
taxes as labor or capital taxes. Typically, the highest efficiency gains can be obtained when the 
tax rates with the highest Marginal Cost of Public Funds
10 are lowered. In contrast, if the 
financing of the environmental subsidy needs higher distorting tax rates, the non-environmental 
efficiency of the economy deteriorates.  
                                                       
10 The marginal cost of public funds associated to a tax is defined as the marginal welfare cost of raising revenue by 
this tax, where the revenue of the tax is spend on public goods that do not affect the consumption of the taxed goods.    
5. POLICY  SIMULATIONS 
We apply our regional CGE model to the NEC directive in Belgium. Belgium and its regions are 
subordinate to EU law. First, we describe the NEC directive. Next, we present the results for six 
alternative scenarios. 
5.1.   NEC Directive 
(a)  International Context of NEC Directive 
The NEC Directive deals with the emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), 
volatile organic compounds (VOC), and ammonia (NH3). These pollutants are transported in 
large quantities across national boundaries. Therefore, the initiative is taken on the EU level. 
The NEC directive, however, leaves it largely to the member states to decide which emission 
reduction measures to take in order to comply with the maximum emission caps. The NEC 
directive is binding as soon as it was approved by the EU Parliament and EU council. 
Although the effects are felt across borders, the considered pollutants have a more 
geographically localized impact than, say, CO2. In the latter case, it does not matter for the 
climate where in the world the CO2 is emitted. The NEC pollutants have a range of 100s of 
kilometers, but their effect is not global. This “local” impact of the NEC pollutants limits the 
scope for the efficiency gains of market-based instruments. The market is not global, and the 
differences in costs of reduction opportunities may be restricted. Nevertheless, the US and 
Canada have experimented with local trading schemes for NOx, SO2 and VOC (e.g. Burtraw, 
1995; Ellerman et al.,1997; Ellerman, 2003ab; Kosobud et al., 2004). Recently, EU Member 
States, as the Netherlands and the UK, have launched local trading schemes meeting the NEC 
requirements. 
Parallel to the development of the EU NEC Directive, most European countries (EU and non-
EU), Russia, the United States and Canada agreed in 1999 on the Gothenburg protocol under 
the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of UNECE
11. The emission ceilings 
in the UNECE protocol are equal or less ambitious than those of the NEC directive. The 
protocol needs to be ratified by all signatories, before coming into force.  
                                                       
11 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.    
(b)  Climate Change and NEC Directive 
The NEC Directive and UNECE Protocol are not the only environmental policies involving air 
pollution. The EU is strongly committed to the Kyoto Protocol. The time frame of both policies 
overlaps. Although the NEC pollutants have a more local effect compared to the global 
greenhouse gases (GHG), there are important synergies between climate and NEC policies. 
Both the GHG and the NEC pollutants are strongly (but not exclusively) linked with energy 
consumption. The reduction of GHG may bring ancillary benefits in the form of lower levels of 
NEC pollutants. Similarly, the NEC directive may also reduce the GHG. These ancillary benefits 
reduce the costs of the environmental policies (Rübbelke, 2002).  
Proost and Van Regemorter (2003), using the partial equilibrium MARKAL/TIMES model, find 
that climate policy alone reduces the NEC pollutants by about 10-20% in Belgium. They find 
also lower GHG for a policy focused on the NEC pollutants. The more local effects of NEC 
pollutants means that the benefits of the NEC policy are more local than the benefits of CO2 
reduction, which can be felt world wide. In addition, the benefits of climate policy may only be 
felt by the future generations, whereas the benefits of the NEC directive can be felt immediately. 
All this may explain a stronger support of the policy makers for policies on NEC pollutants 
compared to climate policies (e.g. the Clean Air Act vs. Kyoto Protocol in US). 
(c)  The NEC Directive and the Environment  
The four NEC pollutants are responsible for acidification, eutrophication and ground-level ozone 
pollution. Acidification is the process whereby air pollution – mainly NH3, SO2 and NOx – is 
converted into acid substances. This ‘acid rain’ damages forests and lakes, soils and ancient 
historical monuments. Moreover, the acidification releases heavy metals into groundwater. SO2 
and NOx are mainly emitted by burning fossil fuels. The most important sectors for SO2 and NOx 
emissions in Belgium are power stations, oil refineries, chemical plants as well as ferro and non-
ferro industry. Most NH3 emissions are generated by livestock production. The latter has more 
short-range effects compared to SO2 and NOx.  
Acidification is a cross-border issue, requiring coordinated initiatives across countries and 
sectors. In Flanders, 57% of the acid deposition comes from neighboring countries, whereas 
Flanders itself is a net exporter of acidifying components. The 1990s saw the SO2 emissions    
drop substantially in the EU, thanks to a combination of European Directives forcing the 
installation of desulphurization systems and the move away from coal as a fossil fuel, and major 
economic restructuring in the new German Lander. Nevertheless, acidification is still a major 
environmental problem in Europe, but the NOx and NH3 deposits have become relatively more 
important. 
The NOx and NH3 emissions also contribute to the eutrophication of the environment. 
Eutrophication is the enrichment of land or water ecosystems with chemical nutrients, and is 
considered a form of pollution because it promotes plant growth, favoring certain species over 
others and forcing a change in species composition and a loss in biodiversity. 
Ozone (O3) has the same chemical structure whether it occurs miles above the earth surface or 
at ground level and can be "good" or "bad," depending on its location in the atmosphere. "Good" 
ozone occurs naturally in the stratosphere and forms a layer that protects life on earth from the 
sun's harmful rays. In the earth's lower atmosphere, ground-level ozone is considered "bad". 
Ozone is not emitted directly into the air, but is created at ground level by a chemical reaction 
between oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOC) in the presence of 
sunlight. Transport and industrial emissions, gasoline vapors, and chemical solvents as well as 
natural sources emit NOx and VOC that contribute to form ozone. Sunlight and hot weather 
cause ground-level ozone to form in harmful concentrations in the air. As a result, it is known as 
a summertime air pollutant. Many urban areas tend to have high levels of "bad" ozone, but also 
rural areas are subject to increased ozone levels because wind carries ozone and pollutants 
away from their original sources. 
Table 4: Belgian Emission Ceilings in NEC and NEC+ (kt/year) 
 NH3 NOx   SO2   VOC 
Belgium (NEC)  74  176  99  139 
Belgium (NEC+)  57  127  76  102 
(d)  NEC Directive in Belgium 
The emission ceilings in the NEC Directive are the result of political bargaining on the EU-level. 
Table 4 represents the emission ceilings in the NEC Directive (NEC) and those in the original    
proposal of the European Commission (NEC+). The emissions in the NEC Directive are less 
stringent than those in the original Commission proposal (Table 4). 
Belgium is a net exporter for most emissions to its neighboring countries. Therefore, the effort 
required from Belgium is among the highest in the EU. This is due to the central location of 
Belgium, and the fact that the country and its neighbors are very densely populated. Within 
Belgium, inter-regional burden sharing agreements split the federal emission levels into 
emission levels for the three regions (Table 5). Each region is responsible for its own emission 
ceilings. The emission ceiling for transport remains at the federal level. The Belgian emission 
ceilings are the sum of the emission ceilings of the three regions and the emission ceiling for 
transport.  
Table 5: Regional Emission Ceilings for 2010 (kt/year) 
   Flanders Wallonia Brussels Transport Belgium 
NH3 45 28.7      73.7 
NOx 58.3  46  3  68  175.3 
SO2 65.8  29  1.4  2  98.2 
VOC 70.9  28  4  35.6 138.5 
5.2.   Scenario Description 
We compare six scenarios to a reference scenario. The reference scenario is the business as 
usual scenario with no climate policy, nor NEC policy. Scenario (i) and scenario (ii) analyze the 
climate policy and NEC policy separately. Scenarios (iii) to (vi) combine both environmental 
policies. However, they differ in the choice of environmental instrument and the responsible 
government level. Scenarios (iii) and (iv) are analyses on the federal level, whereas scenarios 
(v) and (vi) analyze regional environmental policy. Scenarios (iii) and (v) use grandfathered 
environmental permits, whereas scenarios (iv) and (vi) use environmental taxes. The scenarios 
using environmental taxes are budget neutral compared to the reference scenario. The 
governments redistribute the excess environmental tax revenues to their residents through an 
additional transfer of social benefits. This tax recycling scheme is more similar to a lump-sum 
transfer as it does not reduce pre-existing distorting taxes. Hence, this way of tax-recycling 
foregoes efficiency gains as discussed in de Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) and Chapter 2. The    
environmental policies may be cheaper if the excess environmental tax revenues would be used 
to reduce distorting taxes. Auctioning the permits instead of grandfathering would also improve 
the efficiency of the economy. 
All scenarios assume that the rest of the world (including the other EU Member States) do not 
have any new environmental policies.  
(-) Reference  Scenario 
Business as usual: No climate policy, nor NEC policy. The following counterfactual scenarios 
are compared against this reference scenario.   
(i)  Scenario 1: National Climate Policy - No NEC policy – National Permits  
Here, Belgium complies with its commitments for climate policy using national permits. In 2010 
its CO2-emissions are 7,5% lower than in 1990 (or 30% lower compared to 2000). There are no 
NEC initiatives. 
(ii)  Scenario 2: National NEC policy – No Climate Policy – National Permits 
Belgium introduces a NEC policy on the federal level with national permits. There is no Climate 
Policy. 
(iii)  Scenario 3: National Climate and NEC Policies - National Permits 
Belgium uses national permits for its climate and NEC policies. 
(iv)  Scenario 4: National Climate and NEC Policies - National Environmental Taxes 
Belgium uses national environmental taxes for its climate and NEC policies. The federal 
government gets the environmental tax revenues.  
(v)  Scenario 5: Regional Climate and NEC Policies - Regional Permits 
The regional governments are responsible for the environmental policy within their borders. 
They use regional permits for their climate and NEC policies. 
(vi)  Scenario 6: Regional Climate and NEC Policies - Regional Environmental Taxes 
The regional governments are responsible for the environmental policy within their borders. 
They use regional environmental taxes for their climate and NEC policies. The regional 
governments receive the regional environmental tax revenues.     
5.3.   Results 
For the six scenarios, we discuss the effects on the environment, sectoral output, employment, 
commuting and tax revenues and transfers of the various government levels in 2010. All relative 
changes (in %) are w.r.t. the reference scenario. 
Table 6: Change in Emissions (%) 
Pollutant Scenario  Brussels  Flanders  Wallonia  Belgium 
CO2  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -20.61  -30.10  -33.89  -30.37 
CO2  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit  -9.23  -18.98  -21.05  -18.72 
CO2  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit  -17.96  -30.55  -33.73  -30.37 
CO2  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -17.42  -30.67  -33.65  -30.37 
CO2  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -17.97  -30.55  -33.73  -30.37 
CO2  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -17.97  -30.55  -33.73  -30.37 
NH3  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -1.13  -1.13  -1.13  -1.13 
NH3  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit  -28.38  -28.36  -28.36  -28.37 
NH3  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit  -28.38  -28.36  -28.36  -28.37 
NH3  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -28.38  -28.36  -28.36  -28.37 
NH3  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -28.97  -28.36  -28.36  -28.37 
NH3  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -28.97  -28.36  -28.36  -28.37 
NOX  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -16.30  -18.63  -19.90  -18.83 
NOX  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit  -23.48  -30.81  -31.50  -30.47 
NOX  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit  -28.63  -32.57  -33.12  -32.44 
NOX  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -28.31  -32.76  -33.01  -32.50 
NOX  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -28.64  -32.58  -33.12  -32.44 
NOX  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -29.06  -32.65  -33.10  -32.51 
SO2  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -21.16  -19.58  -24.64  -21.17 
SO2  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit  -20.60  -34.10  -34.98  -34.03 
SO2  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit  -22.37  -34.10  -35.45  -34.22 
SO2  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -22.13  -34.11  -35.52  -34.23 
SO2  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -22.34  -34.10  -35.44  -34.21 
SO2  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -22.50  -34.12  -35.45  -34.23 
VOC  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -3.53  -4.46  -5.93  -4.68 
VOC  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit  -34.30  -36.39  -29.45  -34.86 
VOC  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit  -34.98  -37.01  -30.45  -35.56 
VOC  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -34.52  -37.13  -29.87  -35.50 
VOC  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -35.00  -37.01  -30.44  -35.56 
VOC  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -35.04  -36.95  -30.31  -35.50 
PM10  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -5.54  -7.36  -7.34  -7.28 
PM10  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit  -13.38  -8.70  -7.62  -8.56 
PM10  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit  -14.96  -11.32  -10.34  -11.16 
PM10  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -14.02  -11.91  -10.71  -11.63 
PM10  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -14.98  -11.32  -10.31  -11.16 
PM10  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -14.85  -11.80  -10.91  -11.65 
(a) Environment 
Table 6 represents the effects of the six scenarios on the emissions for Belgium and its three 
regions. Scenarios (iii)-(vi) have identical regional and national targets for climate and NEC.    
They only differ in the choice of environmental instruments and the responsible government 
level. Hence, their emission reductions are similar
12. 
Although scenario (i) does not impose explicitly any constraints on the NEC pollutants, we still 
observe important reductions for SO2 (-21%) and NOx (-19%). This result is consistent with the 
results of Proost and Van Regemorter (2003). However, NH3 and VOC show smaller but still 
significant reductions (-1% and -7%, respectively). The reduction of NEC pollutants is an 
important ancillary benefit of climate policy. 
Similarly, scenario (ii) does not include an explicit climate policy, but the CO2 emissions in 
Belgium reduce with almost 19% solely due to a national NEC policy. Hence, lower CO2 
emissions are an important ancillary benefit of NEC policy. 
None of the scenarios impose specific restrictions on PM10 emissions. However, we observe 
significant reductions for PM10 in all scenarios. The climate policy of scenario (i) leads to a 
reduction of more than 7%. The NEC policy of scenario (ii) reduces the PM10 emissions with 
almost 9%. Combining both environmental policy in scenarios (iii)-(vi) leads to 11% less PM10 
emissions. The reduction of PM10 emissions is an important ancillary benefit of both the climate 
and NEC policies. 
Table 7 gives an overview of the marginal abatement costs
13 (euro/ton) for the various 
pollutants for the six scenarios. The very high abatement cost for VOC (at least 80000 euro/ton) 
can be explained by the fact that abatement technology for VOC is not available in the model. 
Hence, the abatement cost is likely to be overestimated. Moreover, the concentrations of VOC 
emissions are low and a ton VOC is linked with a very high level of economic activity. 
The ancillary benefits between the NEC policy and climate policy are well reflected in the 
marginal abatement costs. The marginal cost of CO2 reduction is much higher in climate policy 
scenario (i) than in scenarios (iii)-(vi) where both environmental policies are combined. The 
intuition is that when there is only a constraint on CO2, the emissions with the lowest abatement 
                                                       
12 The small differences in NEC pollutants between scenario (ii) and scenarios (iii)-(vi) are due to the specific modeling 
of the transport sector and its reaction to the changes of economic activity. 
13 The marginal abatement cost of a pollutant with restrictions on multiple joint pollutants, equals the marginal 
abatement cost of the concerned pollutant, keeping the pollutant levels of the other joint pollutants constant.    
costs for CO2 are abated. However, when there are constraints on CO2 and NEC pollutants, the 
overall abatement costs are a function of both the CO2 and NEC abatement costs. Those 
emissions will be cut with the lowest abatement costs for the combined CO2 and NEC 
constraints. Hence, the emissions abated with the combined CO2 and NEC constraints are not 
fully identical to the emissions abated with the CO2 constraint alone. This leaves some “cheap” 
CO2 emissions unabated, as the corresponding NEC abatement costs are too high. This 
reduces the marginal abatement cost of CO2 in scenarios (iii)-(vi) compared to scenario (i). 
Similarly, the marginal costs for SO2 and NOx are higher with only the NEC policy in scenario (ii) 
than in scenarios (iii) to (vi).  
Table 7: Marginal Abatement Costs (Euro/Ton) 
Pollutant Scenario  Brussels  Flanders  Wallonia 
CO2  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  27.02  27.02  27.02 
CO2  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit 0  0  0 
CO2  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit 13.73  13.73  13.73 
CO2  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  13.61  13.61  13.61 
CO2  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit 13.75  13.73  13.75 
CO2  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  14.18  13.55  13.54 
NH3  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  0  0  0 
NH3  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit 5796.10  5796.10  5796.10 
NH3  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit 5672.54  5672.54  5672.54 
NH3  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  5465.48  5465.48  5465.48 
NH3  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit 5916.58  5673.43  5673.42 
NH3  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  5678.17  5456.62  5453.86 
NOX  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  0  0  0 
NOX  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit 247.44  247.44  247.44 
NOX  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit 121.79  121.79  121.79 
NOX  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  116.99  116.99  116.99 
NOX  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit 121.07  121.87  121.97 
NOX  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  130.50  117.38  115.28 
SO2  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  0  0  0 
SO2  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit 319.33  319.33  319.33 
SO2  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit 176.66  176.66  176.66 
SO2  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  160.70  160.70  160.70 
SO2  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit 45.01  176.83  176.54 
SO2  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  163.67  162.67  156.47 
VOC  (i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  0  0  0 
VOC  (ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit 91393.95  91393.95  91393.95 
VOC  (iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit 82402.37  82402.37  82402.37 
VOC  (iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  79890.12  79890.12  79890.12 
VOC  (v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit 82516.43  82405.84  82362.19 
VOC  (vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  79811.14  79642.54  80155.79 
The differences in marginal abatement costs between scenarios (ii) and (iii) to (vi) are much less 
significant for NH3 and VOC, reflecting the lower ancillary benefits between these pollutants and    
climate policy (Table 7). The marginal cost of CO2 reduction is zero in scenario (ii) as there is no 
constraint on CO2 emissions. Similarly, the marginal costs for the NEC pollutants are zero in 
scenario (i). The reduction in marginal abatement costs if the climate policy and NEC policy are 
simultaneously combined shows that the costs of these policies are lower when both policies 
are simultaneously analyzed and implemented (scenarios (iii)-(vi)), than when both policies are 
separately analyzed and implemented (i.e. scenario (i) + (ii)).    
In the national scenarios (iii) and (iv) the abatement costs are identical across the regions. For 
the regional scenarios (v) and (vi), the abatement costs are not equalized. From a perspective 
of Belgium, the national scenarios are more efficient. The differences in regional marginal 
abatement costs are due to the different sector compositions. 
Table 8: Change of Sectoral Output in Regions (%) 
Sectors Scenario  Brussels Flanders Wallonia  Belgium
(i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -2.48  -5.64  -7.01  -5.34 
(ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit 25.35  -24.74  -17.55  -15.52 
(iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit 23.25  -25.41  -19.48  -16.62 
(iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  22.84  -25.31  -19.42  -16.61 
(v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit 23.23  -25.41  -19.46  -16.62 
Energy Sectors 
(vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  22.73  -25.25  -19.60  -16.61 
(i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  3.59  -3.17  -4.65  -3.27 
(ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit -5.97  -8.67  -5.48  -7.59 
(iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit -3.41  -9.43  -7.34  -8.50 
(iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -4.56  -10.53  -8.52  -9.63 
(v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -3.44  -9.42  -7.32  -8.50 
Energy Intensive Sectors 
(vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -4.65  -10.55  -8.62  -9.68 
(i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -0.70  -0.75  -0.76  -0.74 
(ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit -4.39  -4.42  -3.16  -4.18 
(iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit -4.37  -4.43  -3.29  -4.21 
(iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -5.07  -5.13  -3.87  -4.88 
(v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -4.39  -4.43  -3.29  -4.20 
Goods 
(vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -5.15  -5.14  -3.95  -4.91 
(i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -0.48  -0.60  -0.43  -0.53 
(ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit -0.46  -0.40  -0.39  -0.41 
(iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit -0.66  -0.68  -0.58  -0.65 
(iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -0.60  -0.69  -0.48  -0.62 
(v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -0.67  -0.67  -0.58  -0.65 
Services 
(vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -0.64  -0.69  -0.48  -0.63 
(b) Output 
Table 8 summarizes the change in output for four aggregate sectors and six scenarios. 
Obviously, the energy and energy-intensive sectors are more affected by both environmental 
policies. The interactions and ancillary benefits between climate policy and NEC policy are also    
clearly reflected in Table 8. The climate policy of scenario (i) reduces the output of the energy 
sectors with 5% in Belgium. The NEC directive of scenario (ii) reduces the energy output with 
almost 16%. The combination of both policies in scenarios (iii)-(vi), however, reduces the energy 
output with almost 17%. In other words, adding the climate policy to the NEC directive reduces 
the energy output with only 1% more. Similar observations can be made for the energy-
intensive sectors, the goods and services. In most sectors, the output is reduced more with the 
NEC directive than with the climate policy, reflecting the fact that the NEC directive is relatively 
more expensive compared to climate policy. 
As its economic activity generates less pollution, Brussels has a comparative advantage to the 
other regions and attracts more activity when the environmental policy becomes stricter. 
Although one can expect a shift from industrial output to administrative output, the higher output 
for the energy sectors in Brussels is not very realistic. Our model may improve by dropping the 
“perfect substitution assumption” for Brussels and consider the “administrative output” of 
Brussels as a complement for the “industrial output” of the other regions. The output of the 
energy-intensive sectors in Brussels also reacts better to the environmental policies as these 
sectors benefit from the relatively cheaper energy in Brussels compared to the other regions.  
(c) Employment  and  Inter-Jurisdictional  Commuting 
Table 9 represents the effects of the environmental policies on the sectoral and regional 
employment. The effects of Table 9 correlate strongly with the effects observed for the 
output in Table 8. The energy and energy-intensive sectors are more severely affected, 
whereas the employment in the service sector hardly shows any decline. However, the 
changes in employment are relatively smaller than the changes in output, as the positive 
substitution effect due to the price increase of the goods, alleviates the negative output 
effect. Similarly as for the output, the employment of the energy sectors also increases in 
Brussels. Again, the employment decreases much more for the NEC policy than for the 
climate policy. The employment decrease for both policies combined is hardly higher than 
for the NEC policy alone.    
Interestingly, the employment decreases more for both tax scenarios (iv) and (vi) than for the 
other scenarios. Similarly, the real wage decreases with 3.7% for (iv) and (vi), less than the 
decline of almost 5% for the permit scenarios (iii) and (v). This higher decline in employment 
and lower decrease in real wage for both tax scenarios is due to the fact that people have fewer 
incentives to work as they receive higher social benefits through the tax recycling. This tax 
recycling scheme is similar to a lump-sum transfer and does not reduce any pre-existing 
distorting taxes as in Chapter 2.  
Table 9: Change of Sectoral Employment in Regions (%) 
Sectors Scenario  Brussels Flanders Wallonia  Belgium
(i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -0.83  -4.89  -5.68  -4.35 
(ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit 7.62  -16.33  -16.52  -12.14 
(iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit 6.96  -17.22  -18.04  -13.14 
(iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  6.00  -17.69  -18.45  -13.68 
(v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit 6.95  -17.22  -18.02  -13.13 
Energy Sectors 
(vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  5.91  -17.69  -18.56  -13.72 
(i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  4.53  -1.74  -2.70  -1.74 
(ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit -1.11  -4.43  -1.46  -3.20 
(iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit 1.39  -4.84  -2.65  -3.73 
(iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -0.71  -6.83  -4.71  -5.75 
(v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit 1.37  -4.83  -2.63  -3.72 
Energy Intensive Sectors 
(vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -0.85  -6.91  -4.83  -5.85 
(i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -0.29  -0.29  -0.22  -0.27 
(ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit -2.51  -2.91  -2.23  -2.73 
(iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit -2.45  -2.84  -2.19  -2.67 
(iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -3.60  -4.02  -3.21  -3.81 
(v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -2.47  -2.83  -2.19  -2.66 
Goods 
(vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -3.71  -4.07  -3.30  -3.88 
(i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  -0.09  -0.12  -0.01  -0.09 
(ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit -0.23  -0.16  -0.14  -0.17 
(iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit -0.25  -0.21  -0.13  -0.20 
(iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  -0.35  -0.38  -0.17  -0.32 
(v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit -0.26  -0.21  -0.13  -0.20 
Services 
(vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  -0.39  -0.40  -0.18  -0.34 
About 43% of the people working in Brussels come from the other regions. In Flanders about 
6,5% of the active people work in Brussels, whereas for Wallonia this figure is 16%. These 
figures are relatively stable for the various environmental policies and scenarios because all 
regions have to comply with lower emission levels. 
(d)  Government 
In Chapter 2 we explained that environmental policy on the regional level may have important 
consequences for the budget of the federal level. More particularly, Chapter 2 emphasizes that    
the size and sign of the vertical externality depends on the size of the energy tax reform, the 
choice of the tax-recycling scenarios, the initial local and federal tax rates, and the size of the 
federation. However, the models in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 are quite different. First, in Chapter 
2 the output prices and the prices for capital and energy are constant, thanks to the assumption 
of small-open-economy. In Chapter 5, these prices change due to the environmental policy. 
Second, Chapter 2 only uses three input taxes (i.e. on labor, capital and energy). The 
government budgets in chapter 5 are more complex as the model distinguishes between 9 
different categories of receipts (see 3.1). Moreover, in Chapter 2, it depends, among others, on 
the tax recycling scenario (i.e. choice between the distorting input taxes for labor or capital) 
whether a positive or a negative vertical externality can be found. In Chapter 5, the tax recycling 
scheme is more similar to a lump-sum transfer to the households as it does not reduce pre-
existing distorting (input) taxes. 
Table 10 summarizes the evolution in nominal terms of the tax revenues collected by the 
various government levels. The model is calibrated, such that in the reference scenario, the tax 
revenues collected by the lower governments account for about 12% of the total tax revenues 
for all government levels in Belgium. The constitutional monetary transfers, accounting for 
another 12% of the total tax revenues, are not yet included in the tax revenues of the regional 
governments as these transfers correspond to taxes collected by the federal level. Hence, 
changes in the regional tax revenues have a relatively small impact on the total tax revenues of 
Belgium.  
For most scenarios we see a decrease of the total tax revenues. The lower economic activity in 
Belgium generates less tax revenues for the governments. This highest decline (-10%) can be 
found for the initial environmental taxes.  
Scenarios (iv) and (vi), however, use environmental taxes and the environmental tax revenues 
show a five-fold increase. The total tax revenues increase with more than 13%. The respective 
governments transfer these excess tax revenues as social benefits to their residents.    
Scenarios (i), (iv) and (vi) show an increase in the nominal tax revenues for some government 
levels. Here, the effect of the lower economic activity and the lower pollution levels is offset by 
the higher prices, resulting in higher nominal tax revenues. 















(i) National Climate - No NEC - Permit  0.14  0.10  0.19  -0.20  -0.16 
(ii) National NEC - No Climate - Permit  -1.66  -1.81  -2.22  -2.59  -2.51 
(iii) National Climate and NEC - Permit  -1.49  -1.62  -1.97  -2.48  -2.39 
(iv) National Climate and NEC - Tax  3.38  0.47  2.45  15.17  13.52 
(v) Regional Climate and NEC - Permit  -1.47  -1.66  -1.94  -2.50  -2.40 
(vi) Regional Climate and NEC - Tax  58.00  131.48  94.02  0.32  13.60 
Although the nominal size of constitutional transfer is identical for all scenarios, the scenarios 
may differ in the distribution of this transfer across the regions.  We find, however, that the 
differences in distribution across the regions are very small, as both the climate policy and the 
NEC directive affect the personal direct income tax revenues of all regions (see 2.1). A 
unilateral policy of one region may lead to more significant effects on the intergovernmental 
transfers. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter develops a Regional General Equilibrium Model for Belgium.  We start from the EU 
25 GEM E3 model and introduce regional characteristics as inter-regional commuting, a 
national goods market and intergovernmental transfers. 
We illustrate the use of this model with an analysis of the climate policy and NEC directive in 
Belgium subdivided in three regions. The simulations show that this model is suitable for 
analyzing the effect of environmental and energy policies on the regional emissions and the 
regional marginal abatement costs, the regional output of the sectors, the regional employment, 
interregional commuting, and the budgets and transfers of the governments. The model allows 
for unilateral regional policies or for regions not choosing the same environmental targets or 
instruments. 
Our results show that there are important ancillary benefits between the NEC policy and climate 
policy. These ancillary benefits work in both directions and also on pollutants, which are not    
explicitly included in either policy. The simultaneous analysis and implementation of the climate 
policy and NEC policy reduces the costs compared to the case when both policies are 
separately analyzed and implemented. 
The use of this model highly depends on the availability of regional SAM data, regional data on 
emissions, and data on the intergovernmental relations. The available data for the current 
analysis is relatively poor. This data deficiency limits the scope for a thorough regional analysis, 
as the conclusions may be the results of artifacts (e.g. the higher output in Brussels for energy 
sectors).  If more data are available this regional general equilibrium model may become a 
powerful tool to measure the regional effects of federal or regional environmental and energy 
policy.  
Besides the data limitations, other improvements to the model can be made. The current 
analysis is done as if only Belgium has to comply with the climate and NEC policies. In reality, 
all EU Member States have to take initiatives for climate and NEC pollutants. Taking this into 
account would alleviate the decline in economic activity. 
Although the (regional) GEM-E3 model is initially built for the analysis of environmental policies, 
it can also contribute to other socio-economic policy questions. Conrad et al. (2005) use the 
GEM-E3 model to study a reform of labor time in Germany. Using a similar CGE model, Boeters 
et al. (2005) analyze the relation between unemployment and the fiscal regime. Similarly, 
Boeters  et al. (2006a) studies a VAT reform in Germany. Finally, Boeters et al. (2006b) 
compares a number of social reforms for Germany.    
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